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We examine trade and strategic interaction between countries that enforce technical measures 
for fisheries management (e.g., restrictions on fishing gears, vessels, areas and time) when 
countries share access to a common resource stock. Although technical measures are important 
as basic management tools, compliance with such measures makes it more costly for the 
fishermen to catch a certain quantity of fish. We show that under bilateral management, the 
resource exporting country gains from trade, whereas trade causes the steady state utility to fall 
in the resource importing country because the resource exporting country implements 
non-cooperative resource management when demand for a harvest is not so high. Under 
sufficiently high demand for a harvest, maximum sustainable yield can be attained after trade by 
what we call cooperative management; a situation in which both countries are better off. Under 
low demand for a harvest, trade benefits the resource importing country but may harm the 
resource exporting country regardless of whether it implements strict resource management or 
not.  
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1. Introduction 
   Since the rise of the extended  fisheries  jurisdiction during the 1970s, one of the most 
pervasive of the fisheries management problems  has been  the  international  management of 
shared fisheries  resources.  Shared fisheries  stocks occur within two or more Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZs) or the maritime boundary of a national jurisdiction and the adjacent 
high seas.
1  The exploitation of shared stocks can only be managed effectively by cooperation 
between countries concerned. Typical examples are high seas fisheries that are managed by 
intergovernmental  entities called regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs). In 
order to achieve sustainable exploitation of the resources, RFMOs are  responsible for the 
conservation and management of various stocks and/or species, which is mandated by the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. For instance, the International Commission 
for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) applies restrictions against fishing quotas in 
member nations, minimum allowable catch sizes, time closures, restriction and controls on 
fishing gears, and protected areas, etc. However, shared fisheries resources are more likely to be 
over-exploited because their management is a complicated issue that can generate conflict. The 
empirical  studies showed the evidence that  shared fisheries  stocks are indeed prone to 
over-exploitation (e.g., Armstrong and Sumaila (2001) and McWhinnie (2009)).
2  Cooperative 
management based on collaboration in research and joint management can bring about positive 
outcomes.
3
   Recently, the world demand for fish and fishery products has been increasing dramatically. 
Fisheries resources are likely to be over-exploited by international trade because a trade-induced 
increase in the resource price attracts entry into the resource sector. According to the Food and 
  Thus, it is important to consider how international management can be cooperative 
and effective for conservation of shared stocks. 
                                                        
1  Fisheries resource stocks are internationally shared depending on their relationship to national 
boundaries as well as their biological conditions. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) uses 
the term “shared” generically to refer to transboundary, straddling, and highly migratory fish stocks 
(see, e.g., FAO (2004)). 
2  The depletion of highly migratory fish stocks such as tuna has been widely recognized in recent 
years. See, for example, WWF (2006). 
3  An example of cooperative management is joint management of resources in the Barents Sea by 
Norway and Russia. See, for example, Aranda, Murillas, and Motos (2006) and WWF (2008).   3 
Agriculture Organization (FAO)’s the State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2008, fish and 
fishery products are  highly traded  with more than 37% (live weight equivalent) of total 
production entering international trade as various food and feed products. In 2006, world 
exports reached US$85.9 billion  (62.7%  increase  on 1996)  and  194 countries, including 
developing countries with weak  resource management, reported exports of fish and fishery 
products.  It is  commonly argued that  along with  the  lack of effective and cooperative 
management, the depletion of fisheries resource stocks have been expedited by a substantial 
increase in international trade.
4
   Fisheries resources are managed by various methods. There are output controls (such as the 
total allowable catch (TAC) and the individual fishing quota (IFQ)), input controls (or effort 
management) that restricts the total intensity of use of the gear, and technical measures (such as 
restrictions on fishing gears, vessel size, engine power,  fishing  area, time and a minimum 
landing size). While management of catch directly controls fisheries resources, fishing effort 
management  and technical measures  are indirect  controls.  Robust monitoring, control,  and 
surveillance are essential for fisheries management to be effective, regardless of the methods 
(see, e.g., Clark (2006) and Cochrane and Garcia (2009)). 
  Hence, it has significance to clarify the effects of trade on 
shared stocks and enforcement of international resource management. 
   The purpose of this paper is to examine international trade and strategic interaction between 
countries that enforce the technical measures for fisheries management when those countries 
share access to a common resource stock.  We  clarify  gains from trade and how trade 
liberalization affects enforcement of resource management and the level of a shared stock. We 
also  show  and interpret  the conditions under which countries can implement cooperative 
management. 
   The technical measures are important and basic fisheries management, and they are 
                                                        
4  For example, bluefin tuna is one of the highly traded fishery resources. Proposals to ban the trade 
in eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean bluefin tuna have been rejected at the fifteenth meeting of the 
parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES) in Doha, Qatar, in March 2010, despite evidence that stocks of the fish have fallen below 
20% of their historical levels.   4 
historically most widely implemented management tools.
5  There are biological and economic 
aspects in the technical measures. The technical measures reduce catches of small juvenile fish 
and unintended by-catches species, and they also avoid disrupting the spawning process and 
conserve ecosystem. Therefore, enforcement of the technical measures encourages recovery of 
fisheries resource stocks. Economically, it costs more to catch a certain quantity of fish under 
the technical measures than absent such regulations because the technical measures control the 
catch that can be achieved from a given fishing effort.
6
   We develop a two-country, two-good model in which countries enforce optimal technical 
measures to maximize their steady state utility. We introduce resource management into the 
model developed by Takarada (2009) and Takarada, Dong, and Ogawa (2009) who initially 
examined gains from trade under an internationally shared renewable resource in a general 
equilibrium model. Since these studies focused on gains from trade and made no analysis on 
resource management, we compliment their analysis. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is 
the first attempt to examine resource management of shared stocks in a general equilibrium 
model of international trade. 
  Although enforcement of the technical 
measures are  basically  environmentally friendly but economically unfriendly, the  empirical 
studies showed that the technical measures can provide both biological and economic benefits 
(e.g., Pawson, Pickett, and Smith (2005) and Diekert, Hjermann, Nævdal, Stenseth (2010)). 
   We obtain the following results in this paper. First, under bilateral resource management, 
while the resource exporting country gains from trade, trade liberalization may cause steady 
state utility to fall in the resource importing country. When the demand for the harvest is not so 
high, the resource exporting country implements non-cooperative management and mitigates 
enforcement level of  the  technical measures  after  trade.  Although the resource importing 
country enforces strict management, the shared stock is reduced by trade, which leads to an 
                                                        
5  According to FAO (2007, 2009), countries in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean prefer the 
use of gear restrictions (such as restrictions on gear type, gear size, and vessel size) and the use of 
spatial restrictions (especially marine protected areas where fishing is prohibited) over other methods 
for managing marine capture fisheries. See also Chapter 5 of Charles (2001), Cochrane and Garcia 
(2009) and FAO (2002). 
6  For example, restriction on fishing areas (e.g., a marine protected area) cause additional effort for 
fishers to catch a certain quantity of fish.   5 
increase in the price of the harvest. Thus, trade causes steady state utility to fall in the resource 
importing country and rise in the resource exporting country. 
   More importantly, what we call cooperative management in this paper will be attained when 
the demand for the harvest is sufficiently high. Both countries implement strict technical 
measures and the shared stock recovers to maximum sustainable yield (MSY) after trade. We 
should note that MSY is achieved under international trade. Without resource management, 
Takarada (2009) showed that trade never increases the level of the shared stock. We find that 
contrary to conventional wisdom, trade liberalization can control over-exploitation. Thus, both 
countries are better off compared with a non-cooperative management case. This result suggests 
that the negative externalities caused by shared stocks can be internalized by cooperation when 
the harvest good becomes valuable. 
   Second, under low demand for the harvest, the resource importing country gains from trade. 
We demonstrate  a striking result that  trade liberalization may harm the resource exporting 
country although it implements strict resource management which leads to MSY. Intuitively, 
although the stock recovers to MSY, strict management makes the harvest price increase after 
trade in the resource exporting country, and it suffers welfare loss. On the other hand, the price 
of the resource good decreases after trade in the resource importing country, and it gains from 
trade liberalization. 
   In this paper, we focus on the technical measures for fisheries management among others 
because of the following reason. First, the technical measures represent an important and basic 
toolbox in the management policy of many fisheries around the world.  It is reasonable to 
assume that countries concerned implement at least the technical measures. Second, we can 
show the effectiveness of  the  technical measures although management by them  is not the 
first-best policy. It is shown in this paper that  the  technical measures  can  control 
over-exploitation  and attain MSY. More importantly, under acceptable conditions, countries 
implement cooperative management and both countries are better off. The technical measures 
require not only robust monitoring, control, and surveillance but a clear and precise definition of 
regulations because a given effort should correspond to a constant ability to harvest fish. We can   6 
bear enforcement costs if the technical measures bring welfare improvement. This paper is 
intended to show the possibility that the technical measures manage shared stocks effectively 
and achieve Pareto improvement. 
   The existing literature considered optimal resource management in a general equilibrium 
model under a common assumption that each country has a renewable resource that can be 
harvested by residents of that country only. The seminal article by Brander and Taylor (1997) 
examined the effects of trade liberalization in a Ricardian type of general equilibrium model 
when only one country regulates resource harvesting to maximize its steady state utility.
7
   The only exception is Bulte and Damania (2005)  who developed a general equilibrium 
model when countries share access to a common resource stock. They investigated whether 
regulatory policies are strategic substitutes or complements when countries impose taxes on 
extraction effort in order to maximize their own welfare. The authors have not considered gains 
from trade and how trade affects resource management because their focus was on strategic 
interaction between countries. 
  Their 
main result is that a country gains from trade even without resource management when the 
demand for the resource good is sufficiently high. In this case, the other country with optimal 
resource management has comparative advantage in the resource sector and exports the harvest. 
The consumer country without management exports a non-resource good and its local resource 
stock recovers. Therefore, trade will not cause over-exploitation and higher steady state utility is 
achieved in both countries after trade. The authors also showed that a country with resource 
management always gains from trade regardless of the value of the demand parameter for the 
harvest. This paper compliments their analysis by considering the case of shared stocks. 
   The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the framework of the model. 
Section 3 is a preliminary analysis of the technical measures. Section 4 considers feasibility of 
cooperative resource management. Section 5 examines unilateral resource management. The 
concluding remarks will be provided in Section 6. 
                                                        
7  See also Chichilnsky (1993, 1994), Emami and Johnston (2000), Francis (2005), Hotte et al. 
(2000), Jinji (2007), Taylor (2009), and Copeland and Taylor (2009).   7 
 
2. Basic Model 
   We present a two-country, two-good model with the shared renewable resource and show 
the autarkic and trading steady state without resource management. The basic model is based on 
Takarada (2009).  We refer to the countries as “domestic” and “foreign”, which share the 
renewable resource, and use asterisks to denote foreign variables. The two goods are H, which is 
the harvest of the shared stock, and M, which we refer to some other good that may be thought 
of as manufactures.   
 
2.1 Autarkic steady state 
   The present model is a Ricardian type of general equilibrium model.  We focus on the 
domestic country first. The internationally shared renewable stock is an open-access resource. 
Production in both sectors is carried out by profit-maximizing firms operating under the 
condition of free entry. In addition to the shared renewable resource stock  𝑆, there is only one 
other factor of production, labor,  𝐿. 
   The harvesting of the resource is carried out according to the Schaefer harvesting production 
function,  𝐻𝑆 = 𝑞𝑆𝐿𝐻,  where  𝐻𝑆  is  the  supply of the harvest. 𝐿𝐻  is the amount of labor 
employed in the resource sector and  𝑞  reflects the harvesting technology. The relative price of 
the resource good,  𝑝, must equal unit cost of production, i.e.,  𝑝 = 𝑤 𝑞𝑆 ⁄ , where  𝑤  is the wage 
rate. Good  𝑀  is produced with constant returns to scale using labor as the only input, i.e., 
𝑀𝑆 = 𝐿𝑀. Good 𝑀  is treated as the numeraire. Since labor is mobile between the two sectors, 
if manufactures are produced,  𝑤 = 1  must hold. The utility of the country is assumed to be the 
Cobb-Douglas utility function,  𝑢 = 𝐻𝗽𝑀1−𝗽, where  𝗽  is a taste parameter (0 < 𝗽 < 1). We 
assume that the two countries have identical preferences. The demand functions for good  𝐻 
and  𝑀  are  𝐻𝐷 = 𝑤𝗽𝐿/𝑝  and  𝑀𝐷 = 𝑤(1 − 𝗽)𝐿, respectively. Thus, we can solve the outputs 
of  good  𝐻   and  𝑀   in the  temporary equilibrium  as  𝐻 = 𝑞𝗽𝐿𝑆   and  𝑀 = (1 − 𝗽)𝐿 , 
respectively.   8 
   We  describe the basic structure of renewable resource growth. The net  change of the 
resource stock  𝑆  at time  𝑡  is the nature growth rate  𝐺(𝑆)  minus the harvest rate  𝐻. 
     𝑑𝑆 𝑑𝑡 ⁄ = 𝐺(𝑆) − 𝐻.                                                       (1) 
We use a specific functional form for  𝐺  given by 
     𝐺(𝑆) = 𝑟𝑆(1 − 𝑆/𝐾).                                                      (2) 
This functional form for 𝐺(𝑆)  is the logistic function which is widely used in the analysis of 
renewable resources. The variable 𝐾  is the maximum possible size for the resource stock and 
represents the “carrying capacity” of the resource. The variable  𝑟  is the “intrinsic” growth rate. 
The per-capita growth rate 𝐺(𝑆)/𝑆  would be approximately equal to 𝑟  if the current stock is 
relatively small enough compared with the carrying capacity. The growth rate declines linearly 
as  𝑆  increases. 
   Since access to the renewable resource is shared by two countries, the net change of the stock 
at time 𝑡 becomes 
     𝑑𝑆/𝑑𝑡 = 𝐺(𝑆) − 𝐻𝑆 − 𝐻𝑆
∗.                                                  (3) 
A steady state emerges when the resource growth rate 𝐺(𝑆) equals the  world harvest of the 
resource. Solving for the autarkic resource stock yields 
      𝑆𝐴 = 𝐾(1 − 𝑞𝗽𝐿/𝑟 − 𝑞∗𝗽𝐿∗/𝑟).                                               (4) 
The existence of the autarkic equilibrium is assured if  𝑆𝐴  is positive.  𝑆𝐴 > 0  holds if and only 
if 
     𝑟 > 𝑞𝗽𝐿 + 𝑞∗𝗽𝐿∗.                                                        (5) 
   Recalling that wage rate equals 1 under diversified production, we can solve for the autarkic 
price at steady state in each country as follows: 
     𝑝𝐴 = 1 𝑞𝐾(1 − 𝑞𝗽𝐿/𝑟 − 𝑞∗𝗽𝐿∗/𝑟) ⁄ ,  𝑝𝐴
∗ = 1 𝑞𝐾(1 − 𝑞𝗽𝐿/𝑟 − 𝑞∗𝗽𝐿∗/𝑟) ⁄ .             (6) 
We also can obtain the utility in each country at autarkic steady state: 
     𝑢𝐴 = 𝐿[𝑞𝗽𝐾(1 − 𝑞𝗽𝐿 𝑟 ⁄ − 𝑞∗𝗽𝐿∗/𝑟)]𝗽(1 − 𝗽)1−𝗽,                              (7) 
     𝑢𝐴
∗ = 𝐿∗[𝑞∗𝗽𝐾(1 − 𝑞𝗽𝐿 𝑟 ⁄ − 𝑞∗𝗽𝐿∗/𝑟)]𝗽(1 − 𝗽)1−𝗽.                            (8) 
 
2.2 Trading steady state   9 
   We consider trade between two countries that share access to a renewable resource. Without 
the loss of any generality, we assume that the domestic country has lower harvesting technology, 
which can be expressed by 
     𝑞 < 𝑞∗.                                                                    (9) 
This inequality implies that the domestic country has a higher autarkic relative price of the 
resource good, and has a comparative disadvantage in producing it.
8  At the trading steady state, 
the domestic country exports manufactures and imports the resource good, whereas the foreign 
country exports the resource good and imports manufactures. The feature of a model with the 
shared resource is that the difference in the harvesting technology between countries determines 
the patterns of trade, which is similar to a standard Ricardian model.
9
   There are three production  patterns of trading steady state  to be considered.  First,  the 
domestic country diversifies and the foreign country specializes in the resource good. Second, 
the domestic country specializes in manufactures, whereas the foreign country specializes in the 
resource good. Third, the domestic country specializes in manufactures and the foreign country 
diversifies. Appendix A will show the specific calculations for each pattern. Intuitively, the first 
pattern occurs when the demand for the harvest good is high, whereas the third pattern arises 
under low demand for the harvest. The second pattern appears  under mild demand for the 
harvest.  In the following sections, we focus our analysis  on the first pattern because both 
countries produce the resource good so that both countries can enforce resource management. 
The other two patterns will be examined in Section 5. 
 
   We explain the trading steady state of the first pattern (see Appendix A.1). Both countries 
produce the resource good if and only if the following inequality holds: 
     𝗽𝐿/(1 − 𝗽)𝐿∗ > 𝑞∗/𝑞 .                                                 (10) 
In this case, the following result is derived. The post-trade shared renewable resource stock is 
the same as autarky. Therefore, condition (5)  must hold to ensure  the  existence of the 
                                                        
8  The relative prices of the two countries are the same in autarky if  𝑞 = 𝑞∗. There is no incentive 
for each country to open to trade. 
9  As in Brander and Taylor (1998), an analog of “factor proportions” for the renewable resource 
determines the patterns of trade when resources are not internationally shared.   10 
equilibrium. Trade liberalization makes no change of steady state utility in the domestic country 
and causes steady state utility to rise in the foreign country. 
   Intuition of this result is as follows. Since both countries produce the resource good after 
trade, the zero-profit condition must be satisfied with interior solutions. If we assume that the 
resource stock is reduced by trade, the world price of the resource good must be above the 
domestic autarkic price, which is higher than the foreign autarkic price. However, that world 
price cannot clear the material balance condition. Thus, the post-trade and autarky resource 
stock must remain the same, so does the production of the resource good. The welfare effect of 
each country is quite normal. 
 
 
3. Preliminary Analysis 
   We consider the optimal technical measures by either of the two countries although both 
countries harvest and can enforce resource management.  We assume that the government’s 
problem is to maximize the steady state utility by setting the optimal harvesting technology. The 
technical measures control the catch that can be achieved from a given fishing effort. This 
implies that under the strict (weak) technical measures, fishers catch fish as if they are using 
inferior (superior) harvesting technology. In this paper, enforcement of the technical measures is 
modeled as restriction on  the harvesting technology.  We assume  that  enforcement of  the 
technical measures is costless for simplicity. Moreover, it is assumed throughout this paper that 
Eq.(9) holds even under resource management. This assumption is necessary for determining 
the trade pattern. Note that 𝑞 < 𝑞∗  has no implication that the domestic country enforces in 
fact strict resource management. The difference may just arise from the fact that the domestic 
country has inferior harvesting technology in terms of the technological sense. 
   We focus on the case in which the foreign country, which exports the harvest, implements 
resource management. When the domestic country, which exports manufactures, enforces the 
technical measures, the effects of trade are the same as those without resource management.   11 
This is because that the domestic utility function remains the same even after opening trade and 
its government has no incentive to alter its harvesting technology. Therefore, even after trade, 
the domestic country enforces the optimal technical measures in autarky. 
 
3.1 Autarkic steady state under resource management 
   The foreign government enforces the technical measures to maximize the autarkic utility 
function, Eq.(8). The foreign government’s problem can be simplified as 
     max𝑞∗≥0𝑞∗(𝑟 − 𝑞𝗽𝐿 − 𝑞∗𝗽𝐿∗).                                                 (11) 
Solving the maximization problem yields the optimal autarkic harvesting technology, 
     𝑞𝐴
∗ = (𝑟 − 𝑞𝗽𝐿) 2𝗽𝐿∗ ⁄ .                                                       (12) 
The second-order condition is satisfied. 
   We can easily obtain the new autarkic steady state as follows: 
     𝑆𝐴′ = 𝐾(1 − 𝑞𝗽𝐿/𝑟) 2 ⁄ ,                                                     (13) 
     𝑝𝐴′ = 2 𝑞𝐾(1 − 𝑞𝗽𝐿/𝑟) ⁄ ,  𝑝𝐴
∗′ = 4𝗽𝐿∗ 𝑟𝐾(1 − 𝑞𝗽𝐿/𝑟)2 ⁄ ,                            (14) 
     𝑢𝐴′ = [(𝑞𝗽𝐾/2)(1 − 𝑞𝗽𝐿/𝑟)]𝗽(1 − 𝗽)1−𝗽𝐿,                                    (15) 
     𝑢𝐴
∗′ = [(𝑟𝐾/4)(1 − 𝑞𝗽𝐿/𝑟)2]𝗽{(1 − 𝗽)𝐿∗}1−𝗽  .                               (16) 
We assume  𝑟 > 𝑞𝗽𝐿, which assures  𝑆𝐴
′ > 0. 
 
3.2 Trading steady state under resource management 
   Now we consider free trade when the domestic country diversifies and the foreign country 
specializes in the steady state. To make sure that the foreign country has comparative advantage 
in the harvest,  𝑞 < 𝑞𝐴
∗  must hold. Then, we have 
     𝑟 > 𝑞𝗽(𝐿 + 2𝐿∗).                                                         (17) 
Under Eq.(17), 𝑆𝐴′ > 0  holds.  After opening trade, the  problem  of the foreign government 
becomes maximizing the post-trade steady state utility  𝑢1
∗  (see Appendix A.1), which can be 
simplified as 
     max𝑞∗≥0𝑞∗(𝑟 − 𝑞𝗽𝐿 − 𝑞∗𝗽𝐿∗)𝗽.                                              (18) 
Then, we obtain the optimal post-trade harvesting technology as   12 
     𝑞1
∗ = (𝑟 − 𝑞𝗽𝐿) (1 + 𝗽)𝗽𝐿∗ ⁄ .                                                 (19) 
We can easily show that the second-order condition is satisfied. We can derive that 𝑞1
∗ > 𝑞𝐴
∗. 
This implies that the foreign country implements weaker resource management after trade. 
   Since both kinds of goods are produced in the domestic country, 𝑤 = 1  must hold. On the 
other hand, the foreign country only produces the resource good, we have 𝑤∗ ≥ 1. The world 
price of the resource good,  𝑝𝑇1, can be written as  𝑝𝑇1 = 1/𝑞𝑆𝑇1 = 𝑤∗/𝑞1
∗𝑆𝑇1, where 𝑆𝑇1  is 
the post-trade shared stock.  Thus, we derive  𝑤∗ = 𝑞1
∗/𝑞 > 1, which implies  𝑟 > 𝑞𝗽[𝐿 +
1+𝗽𝐿∗.  The demand for  manufactures is 𝑀𝐷=1−𝗽𝐿  in the domestic country and 
𝑀𝐷
∗ = (1 − 𝗽)(𝑞1
∗/𝑞)𝐿∗   in the foreign country.  The world supply of manufactures can be 
expressed as  𝑀𝑆 = 𝐿 − 𝐿𝐻. The marker-clearing condition for  manufactures  is  given by 
 𝐿𝐻 = 𝗽𝐿 − (1 − 𝗽)(𝑞1
∗/𝑞)𝐿∗ = [𝑞𝗽𝐿(1 + 𝗽2) − 𝑟(1 − 𝗽)] 𝑞𝗽(1 + 𝗽) ⁄ . 
   We derive the necessary and sufficient condition for this steady state. Since both goods are 
produced in the domestic country,  we  must  have  0 < 𝐿𝐻 < 𝐿 , which implies 
𝑟 < 𝑞𝗽𝐿(1 + 𝗽2) (1 − 𝗽) ⁄ . This steady state also requires  𝐺(𝑆𝑇1) = 𝑞𝑆𝑇1𝐿𝐻 + 𝑞1
∗𝑆𝑇1𝐿∗. Then, 
we have  𝑆𝑇1 = 𝗽𝐾(1 − 𝑞𝗽𝐿/𝑟) (1 + 𝗽) ⁄   which is positive by Eq.(17). Summing up, we have 
the necessary condition as follows: 
     𝑞𝗽[𝐿 + (1 + 𝗽)𝐿∗] < 𝑟 < 𝑞𝗽𝐿(1 + 𝗽2) (1 − 𝗽) ⁄ .                             (20) 
To show sufficiency, we rewrite  Eq.(20) as  𝑞𝗽[𝐿 + (1 + 𝗽)𝐿∗] < 𝑞𝗽𝐿(1 + 𝗽2) (1 − 𝗽) ⁄ , 
which  results in  𝗽𝐿 > (1 − 𝗽)𝐿∗.  Suppose that the foreign country produces both goods, 
𝗽𝐿 < (1 − 𝗽)𝐿∗  must hold (See Appendix A.2). This is contradiction and the foreign country 
produces only the resource good if  𝗽𝐿 > (1 − 𝗽)𝐿∗. On the other hand, the second inequality 
of Eq.(20),  𝑟 < 𝑞𝗽𝐿(1 + 𝗽2) (1 − 𝗽) ⁄ ,  can be rewritten as 𝑟 < 2𝑞𝗽𝐿 (1 − 𝗽) ⁄   because 
1 + 𝗽2 < 2.  Suppose that the domestic country  is also specialized and produces only 
manufactures,  𝑟 ≥ 2𝑞𝗽𝐿 (1 − 𝗽) ⁄   must hold (see Appendix B.2). This is contradiction. Hence, 
Eq.(20) ensures the specialized steady state for the foreign country and diversified steady state 
for the domestic country. 
   We  can  show that the shared stock decreases after trade (𝑆𝑇1 < 𝑆𝐴
′).  Intuitively, this is 
because  𝑞1
∗ > 𝑞𝐴
∗.  We have 𝑝𝑇1 = 1 𝑞𝑆𝑇1 ⁄ > 𝑝𝐴′ = 1 𝑞𝑆𝐴′ ⁄   because  𝑆𝑇1 < 𝑆𝐴
′.  Recall that   13 
even without resource management, the foreign country gains from trade in this trading steady 
state (see Appendix A.1). With resource management, the foreign country can choose the 
optimal harvesting technology. Thus, the foreign country  unambiguously  gains from trade. 
However, trade harms the domestic country because the nominal income remains the same after 
trade. Intuitively, from Eq.(7), we know that the domestic welfare deteriorates if the foreign 
harvesting technology rises (𝜕𝑢𝐴/𝜕𝑞∗ < 0). This implies that the domestic country is worse off 
by weak resource management in the foreign country. The analysis above can be summarized in 
the following proposition. 
 
Proposition  1.  Suppose that  only  the foreign country enforces  the  technical measures.  The 
trading steady state is diversified for the domestic country and the foreign country specializes in 
the resource good, if and only if  𝑞𝗽[𝐿 + (1 + 𝗽)𝐿∗] < 𝑟 < 𝑞𝗽𝐿(1 + 𝗽2) (1 − 𝗽) ⁄ . Then, we 
obtain the following results: 
(i) the foreign country implements weak resource management after trade; 
(ii) the post-trade shared stock is reduced by trade; 
(iii) the foreign country with optimal resource management always gains from trade; 
(iv) the domestic country without resource management always suffers utility loss after trade. 
 
   This result has the following implication. Since trade mitigates enforcement level of the 
technical measures, trade cannot bring a win-win situation. This may arise from the fact that one 
country implements resource management although both countries can implement resource 
management. Since the domestic country is harmed by trade, it has an incentive to enforce the 
technical measures. The case of bilateral resource management is considered in the next section. 
Moreover, we can suggest how to modify the enforcement level after trade. We  derive 
𝑞1
∗/𝑞𝐴
∗ = 2/(1 + 𝗽)  which indicates that the foreign government can change the enforcement 
level if it collects information of preferences. The new enforcement level never exceeds twice of 
the autarky level. 
   The production pattern considered in this section will arise when the demand for the harvest   14 
is high. This may correspond to the severe overuse case in Brander and Taylor (1997) who 
examined resource management  when  each country has a renewable resource that can be 
harvested by residents of that country only. The authors demonstrated that trade benefits not 
only a country with resource management, which exports the resource good, but a country 
without resource management, which imports the resource good, although they considered only 
the case of diversification in both countries. However, we show that the resource importing 
country without resource management is always harmed by trade. Our result may imply that 
their result is dependent on the assumption of local renewable resources. 
 
4. Bilateral Resource Management 
   We consider bilateral resource management and clarify whether cooperative management 
can be achieved. We assume that a country enforces the technical measures to maximize its own 
welfare, provided a given enforcement level of the technical measures in the other country. 
   Let us examine the autarkic equilibrium. Each government solves the maximization problem 
such as Eq.(11). Then, the reaction functions of the domestic and foreign country  are  𝑞 =
(𝑟 − 𝑞∗𝗽𝐿∗) 2𝗽𝐿 ⁄   and  𝑞∗ = (𝑟 − 𝑞𝗽𝐿) 2𝗽𝐿∗ ⁄ , respectively. Each country’s reaction curve has 
a negative slope. We can easily show that equilibrium is unique and stable. We obtain the 
optimal autarkic harvesting technology in the domestic and foreign country as follows: 
     𝑞𝑎 = 𝑟/3𝗽𝐿,  𝑞𝑎
∗ = 𝑟/3𝗽𝐿∗.                                                (21) 
From Eq.(21), we can obtain the autarkic steady state under bilateral resource management as 
follows: 
     𝑆𝑎 = 𝐾/3,  𝑝𝑎 = 9𝗽𝐿/𝑟𝐾,  𝑝𝑎
∗ = 9𝗽𝐿∗/𝑟𝐾,                                 (22) 
     𝑢𝑎 = (𝑟𝐾/9)𝗽[(1 − 𝗽)𝐿]1−𝗽,  𝑢𝑎
∗ = (𝑟𝐾/9)𝗽[(1 − 𝗽)𝐿∗]1−𝗽.                     (23) 
   These variables may be smaller or larger than those in Eqs.(13)-(16) depending on the value 
of  𝑞. Under bilateral resource management, the difference between 𝑢𝑎  and  𝑢𝑎
∗  only depends 
on the labor endowment in each country,  𝐿  and  𝐿∗. This arises from the fact that each country 
harvests the same quantity, 𝑟𝐾 9 ⁄ , and only the output of manufactures differs between   15 
countries. Eq.(21) implies that both countries control over-exploitation in the same way. 
   The technical measures are strategic substitutes in our model. Bulte and Damania (2005) 
showed a similar result that taxes on extraction effort are strategic substitutes under autarky and 
also in the context of a two-country model, although two countries are diversified in production 
in their model. 
 
4.1 Non-cooperative resource management 
   We consider a trading equilibrium in which each government chooses the enforcement level 
simultaneously in order to maximize its own welfare. Without the loss of any generality, we still 
assume that the domestic country exports manufactures, whereas the foreign country exports the 
resource good. 
   Each government sets the optimal harvesting technology to maximize the post-trade utility, 
𝑢1  in the domestic country and  𝑢1
∗  in the foreign country (see Appendix A.1). The reaction 
function in  the domestic and foreign country are  denoted by  𝑞 = (𝑟 − 𝑞∗𝗽𝐿∗) 2𝗽𝐿 ⁄   and 
𝑞∗ = (𝑟 − 𝑞𝗽𝐿) (1 + 𝗽)𝗽𝐿∗ ⁄ , respectively. Then, the optimal post-trade harvesting technology 
for each country is given by 
     𝑞𝑛 = 𝑟 (1 + 2𝗽)𝐿 ⁄ ,  𝑞𝑛
∗ = 𝑟 (1 + 2𝗽)𝗽𝐿∗ ⁄ .                                    (24) 
This is what we call “non-cooperative resource management” case. We can easily show that 
𝑞𝑛 𝑞𝑎 ⁄ = 3𝗽/(1 + 2𝗽) < 1  and  𝑞𝑛
∗/𝑞𝑎
∗ = 3/(1 + 2𝗽) > 1. This implies that the domestic 
country implements strict resource management, whereas the foreign country implements weak 
resource management after trade. We can also  know  that the domestic country implements 
stricter resource management and the foreign country implements weaker resource management 
if the demand for the harvest becomes low (i.e., a smaller  𝗽). 
   We obtain the post-trade resource stock as  𝑆𝑛 = 𝗽𝐾/(1 + 2𝗽)  which is less than  𝑆𝑎. Since 
the zero profit condition in the resource sector, 𝑝𝑛𝑞𝑛𝑆𝑛 = 1, holds,  𝑝𝑛 = (1 + 2𝗽)2𝐿 𝗽𝑟𝐾 ⁄   is 
the world price of the harvest. Assumption Eq.(9) becomes  𝑞𝑛 < 𝑞𝑛
∗  and diversification for the 
domestic country requires  0 < 𝐿𝐻 < 𝐿. Using a similar method as in Section 3, we can obtain 
that  𝐿𝐻 = 𝐿(1 + 𝗽 − 1/𝗽). Thus, these conditions are rewritten as   16 
     𝗽𝐿∗ < 𝐿,  �√5 − 1�/2 < 𝗽 < 1.                                             (25) 
   We assume that  𝑟 < 2𝑞𝗽𝐿/(1 − 𝗽). Note that this assumption ensures production of the 
resource good in the domestic country.  Under bilateral resource management, the domestic 
country may choose sufficiently small 𝑞  which leads to no production of the resource good. 
We  consider how we can  exclude such cases.  Suppose that  the domestic country does not 
produce the resource good. Then, specialization occurs in both countries and the foreign country 
chooses the optimal technical measures,  𝑞3
∗ = 𝑟 2𝐿∗ ⁄   (see Section 5.2). From Appendix A.3, we 
have  𝑆3 = 𝐾 2 ⁄ ,  𝑝3 = 4𝑤∗𝐿∗ 𝑟𝐾 ⁄ , and  𝑤∗ = 𝗽𝐿/(1 − 𝗽)𝐿∗   under  𝑞3
∗ = 𝑟 2𝐿∗ ⁄   (see 
Appendix B.2). If  𝑝3𝑞𝑆3 > 1  holds, it is profitable for the domestic country to produce the 
resource good.  Then, we obtain 𝑝3𝑞𝑆3 = 2𝑞𝗽𝐿 (1 − 𝗽)𝑟 ⁄ > 1 .  Hence, the assumption 
𝑟 < 2𝑞𝗽𝐿/(1 − 𝗽)  implies that the domestic country chooses a certain level of 𝑞  that ensures 
production of the resource good. 
   Substituting the variables under non-cooperative resource management in 𝑢1  and  𝑢1
∗, we 
obtain the post-trade utility in each country as follows: 
     𝑢𝑛 = [𝑟𝐾𝗽2 (1 + 2𝗽)2 ⁄ ]𝗽[(1 − 𝗽)𝐿]1−𝗽,                                     (26) 
     𝑢𝑛
∗ = 𝗽2𝗽−1[𝑟𝐾 (1 + 2𝗽)2 ⁄ ]𝗽[(1 − 𝗽)𝐿]1−𝗽.                                 (27) 
It is easy to show that 𝑢𝑛 < 𝑢𝑎. We know that the foreign country benefits from reduction of 
the harvesting technology in the domestic country. Thus, the foreign country always gains from 
trade. Summing up, we obtain the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 1. Suppose that both countries implement resource management and non-cooperative 
resource management  occurs after trade. The conditions  for this case are  𝗽𝐿∗ < 𝐿  and 
�√5 − 1�/2 < 𝗽 < 1. Then, we obtain the following results: 
(i) the foreign country implements weak resource management, whereas the domestic country 
implements strict resource management after trade; 
(ii) the post-trade shared stock is reduced by trade; 
(iii) the foreign country always gains from trade;   17 
(iv) the domestic country always suffers utility loss after trade. 
 
   We should note that the domestic country which imports the harvest is worse off after trade 
even if it implements strict resource management. Recall that trade harms the domestic country 
when the technical measures are only enforced by the foreign country (Proposition 1). The 
shared stock is still reduced by trade and the world harvest price increases after trade in the 
domestic country. This causes welfare loss in the domestic country because its nominal income 
remains the same as autarky. On the other hand, the foreign country gains from trade because of 
the rise in the wage rate, i.e., 𝑤𝑛
∗ = 𝐿 𝗽𝐿∗ ⁄ > 𝑤𝑎
∗ = 1. Intuitively, the foreign country benefits 
from setting its technical measures optimally and also from strict resource management by the 
domestic country. The result suggests that the negative externalities caused by the shared stock 
is not fully internalized under non-cooperative resource management. 
 
4.2 Cooperative resource management 
   We  examine the effects of cooperative  resource management because each country can 
improve  the other country’s  welfare by making a marginal decrease in its own  post-trade 
harvesting technology that is realized in the non-cooperative equilibrium. It is not odd to assume 
that  the  foreign country  has  the  bargaining  power  over international resource management 
because it can benefit from trade even under non-cooperative resource management. Since the 
domestic country is worse off under non-cooperative resource management, the domestic 
government will reach an agreement if its welfare remains at least the same as autarky. Thus, it 
is reasonable to consider an equilibrium in which the foreign government maximizes its own 
welfare  while keeping the domestic welfare  as  same as  autarky. From Appendix A.1, the 
maximization problem is simplified as 
     max𝑞≥0,𝑞∗≥0ln𝑞∗ − (1 − 𝗽)ln𝑞 + 𝗽ln(𝑟 − 𝑞𝗽𝐿 − 𝑞∗𝗽𝐿∗)  
     s.t.  𝑞(𝑟 − 𝑞𝗽𝐿 − 𝑞∗𝗽𝐿∗) ≥ 𝑌,                                              (28) 
where  𝑌 ≡ 𝑞𝑎(𝑟 − 𝑞𝑎𝗽𝐿 − 𝑞𝑎
∗𝗽𝐿∗) = 𝑟2 9𝗽𝐿 ⁄ . Solving an interior solution for each country, 
the following first-order conditions must be satisfied:   18 
     −(1 − 𝗽) 𝑞 ⁄ − 𝗽2𝐿 (𝑟 − 𝑞𝗽𝐿 − 𝑞∗𝗽𝐿∗) + 𝜈(𝑟 − 2𝑞𝗽𝐿 − 𝑞∗𝗽𝐿∗) ⁄ = 0,           (29) 
     1 𝑞∗ ⁄ − 𝗽2𝐿∗ (𝑟 − 𝑞𝗽𝐿 − 𝑞∗𝗽𝐿∗) − 𝜈𝑞𝗽𝐿∗ ⁄ = 0,                              (30) 
     𝑞(𝑟 − 𝑞𝗽𝐿 − 𝑞∗𝗽𝐿∗) = 𝑌,                                                 (31) 
where  𝜈  is a Lagrange multiplier. Then, we obtain 
     𝑞𝑐 = 2𝑟 9𝗽𝐿 ⁄ ,  𝑞𝑐
∗ = 5𝑟 18𝗽𝐿∗ ⁄ .                                               (32) 
This is what we call “cooperative resource management” case. We obtain that 𝑞𝑐 𝑞𝑎 ⁄ = 2 3 ⁄  
and  𝑞𝑐
∗ 𝑞𝑎
∗ ⁄ = 5 6 ⁄ , which implies that changes in enforcement level is independent of the 
parameters. 
   We derive the conditions  for cooperative resource management. The domestic labor 
employed in the resource sector is denoted by  𝐿𝐻 = (9𝗽 − 5)𝐿/4. Assumption Eq.(9) becomes 
𝑞𝑐 < 𝑞𝑐
∗  and diversification for the domestic country requires  0 < 𝐿𝐻 < 𝐿. These conditions 
are rewritten as 
     4𝐿∗ < 5𝐿,  5/9 < 𝗽 < 1.                                                   (33) 
As in Section 4.1, we assume that  𝑟 < 2𝑞𝗽𝐿/(1 − 𝗽). This assumption ensures that the 
domestic country has a certain harvesting technology and produces the resource good. 
   We can derive the post-trade resource stock as  𝑆𝑐 = 𝐾/2  which is MSY. The world price 
of the harvest is  𝑝𝑐 = 𝑝𝑎 = 9𝗽𝐿/𝑟𝐾  and the foreign demand for the harvest is denoted by 
𝐻𝐷
∗ = 5𝑟𝐾 36 ⁄ . Since the domestic nominal income remains the same as autarky, its welfare 
also remains unchanged.  We can obtain the post-trade  utility under cooperative resource 
management in the foreign country as 
     𝑢𝑐
∗ = (5 4 ⁄ )(𝑟𝐾/9)𝗽[(1 − 𝗽)𝐿]1−𝗽.                                          (34) 
We can easily show  𝑢𝑐
∗ > 𝑢𝑎
∗. The foreign country gains from trade because of the usual reason. 
Summing up, we obtain the following lemma. The proof of Lemma 2 is straightforward. 
 
Lemma  2.  Suppose  that  both countries  implement  resource management and cooperative 
resource management  occurs after trade. The conditions  for this case are  4𝐿∗ < 5𝐿  and 
5/9 < 𝗽 < 1. Then, we obtain the following results: 
(i) both countries implement strict resource management after trade;   19 
(ii) the post-trade shared stock recovers to MSY after trade; 
(iii) the foreign country always gains from trade; 
(iv) the utility level of the domestic country remains the same as autarky. 
 
   Comparing variables under cooperative resource management with those under other cases, 
we  can show  that  𝑞𝑐 < 𝑞𝑛 < 𝑞𝑎,  𝑞𝑐
∗ < 𝑞𝑎
∗ < 𝑞𝑛
∗ ,  and  𝑆𝑛 < 𝑆𝑎 < 𝑆𝑐 .  Under cooperative 
resource management, both countries implement most strict resource management so that MSY 
is achieved.  Therefore, the world supply of the harvest is the maximum level. Although 
derivation of MSY may depend on the specific functional forms of the model, the result 
suggests  that contrary to conventional wisdom, trade liberalization  can  mitigate 
over-exploitation through cooperative resource management. 
 
4.3 Cooperation or non-cooperation 
   Now we consider feasibility of cooperative resource management. Comparing the conditions 
of non-cooperative and cooperative resource management, there exists an overlapped range, i.e., 
     �√5 − 1� 2 ⁄ < 𝗽 < 1,  𝐿∗/𝐿 < min{5/4, 1/𝗽}.                                  (35) 
We know that the domestic country always prefers cooperative management. However, it is 
ambiguous whether the foreign country which has the bargaining power prefers cooperative 
management. From the analysis above, we have 
     𝑢𝑛
∗ 𝑢𝑐
∗ ⁄ = (4 5𝗽 ⁄ )[3𝗽 (1 + 2𝗽) ⁄ ]2𝗽                                          (36) 
We can show that the right hand side of Eq.(36) is strictly decreasing when  �√5 − 1�/2 < 𝗽 <
1.  We can  also  find that lim𝗽→�√5−1�/2(𝑢𝑛
∗/𝑢𝑐
∗) > 1  and  lim𝗽→1(𝑢𝑛
∗/𝑢𝑐
∗) < 1. Thus, there 
exists  𝗽 �  that satisfies 𝑢𝑛
∗ 𝑢𝑐
∗ ⁄ = 1, i.e., 𝗽 � ≈ 0.64310.  The  foreign country will choose 
non-cooperative  resource management  under  �√5 − 1� 2 ⁄ < 𝗽 ≤ 𝗽 �   because  𝑢𝑛
∗ ≥ 𝑢𝑐
∗ , 
whereas  the  foreign country will cooperate with  the  domestic country  under  𝗽 � < 𝗽 < 1 
because  𝑢𝑛
∗ < 𝑢𝑐
∗. Note that the decision by the foreign government only depends on the taste   20 
parameter,  𝗽. 
   Then, we obtain the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2. Suppose that both countries implement resource management and the conditions 
�√5 − 1� 2 ⁄ < 𝗽 < 1  and  𝐿∗/𝐿 < 𝑚𝑖𝑛{5/4, 1/𝗽}  hold.  Then, the  foreign country chooses 
non-cooperative resource management if  �√5 − 1� 2 ⁄ < 𝗽 ≤ 𝗽 �. Otherwise, the foreign country 
implements cooperative resource management. 
 
   Intuition of this result is as follows. When the demand for the resource good is high (𝗽 > 𝗽 �), 
its relative price is also high so that we can benefit from producing the resource good more. The 
terms-of-trade effects are in favor of the resource exporting country and therefore it has an 
incentive to control over-exploitation and attain MSY. We can show that the quantity of the 
harvest in the foreign country under cooperation,  𝐻𝑆𝑐
∗ = 5𝑟𝐾 36𝗽 ⁄ , is larger than that under 
non-cooperation,  𝐻𝑆𝑛
∗ = 𝑟𝐾 (1 + 2𝗽)2 ⁄ .  Therefore,  the foreign country benefits  much form 
cooperation. However, when the demand for the harvest is not so high, the harvest price is not 
high enough for the foreign country to cooperate. The foreign country can be better off by 
non-cooperative resource management because the foreign country discontinues keeping the 
welfare level of the domestic country  and the domestic country implements strict resource 
management even under non-cooperation. 
   We should note that cooperative resource management is feasible without sanctions or side 
payments by countries concerned. The point is the price effect which plays an important role in 
a general equilibrium model. The resource exporting country prefers a large quantity of the 
harvest if the harvest price becomes sufficiently high. This feature also depends on the setting 
such that the resource exporting country is not myopic and maximizes its steady state utility. 
   Taking the demand parameter,  𝗽, as the horizontal axis and the ratio of labor endowments 
between countries,  𝐿∗/𝐿, as the vertical axis, we can depict the non-cooperative and cooperative 
resource management areas (see Figure 1). The shadow part is the cooperation area and the   21 
shading part is the non-cooperation area. When  5 9 ⁄ < 𝗽 < �√5 − 1� 2 ⁄ , there only exists the 
cooperative equilibrium. In this case, the price of the harvest is low so that it is beneficial for the 
foreign country to sustain MSY.  There only exists  the  non-cooperative equilibrium  when 




5. Unilateral Resource Management 
   There still left other two trading steady states to be discussed. Since the domestic country 
specializes in producing manufactures at both of these steady states, only the foreign country 
can enforce the technical measures after trade. We examine the effects of trade when only the 
foreign country implements resource management in autarky. We may also consider the case of 
bilateral resource management in autarky as in Section 4 but the effects of trade are ambiguous. 
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Thus, we focus on the autarkic equilibrium which is examined in Section 3.1. 
 
5.1 Specialization only in the domestic country 
   Without the technical measures, the pattern of production is specialized for the domestic 
country and diversified for the foreign country, if and only if  𝗽𝐿/(1 − 𝗽)𝐿∗ < 1  (see Appendix 
A.2). Intuitively, this production pattern occurs when the demand for the harvest is low. In this 
case, the shared resource stock is reduced by trade. We assume  𝑟 > 𝑞∗𝗽(𝐿 + 𝐿∗)  to make sure 
the post-trade resource stock to be positive. Free trade may cause the domestic steady state 




   Now we consider resource management by the foreign country. Resource management is 
meaningless in the domestic country because it specializes in manufactures.  The  foreign 
government’s problem  is to maximize  the  post-trade  steady state utility,  𝑢2
∗. This can be 
simplified as  max𝑞∗≥0 𝑞∗[𝑟 − 𝑞∗𝗽(𝐿 + 𝐿∗)]. Then, we obtain the optimal post-trade harvesting 
technology as 
     𝑞2
∗ = 𝑟 2𝗽(𝐿 + 𝐿∗) ⁄ .                                                    (37) 
Assumption Eq.(9) implies that 𝑟 > 2𝑞𝗽(𝐿 + 𝐿∗). The necessary and sufficient condition for 
this steady state is 
     𝗽𝐿 < (1 − 𝗽)𝐿∗.                                                            (38) 
Comparing Eq.(12) with Eq.(37), we have  𝑞2
∗ < 𝑞𝐴
∗  because  𝑟 > 2𝑞𝗽(𝐿 + 𝐿∗). This indicates 
that  the foreign country  implements  strict resource management after trade.  Under  𝑞2
∗, the 
shared stock recovers up to MSY. Then, we obtain the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3. Suppose that only the foreign country implements resource management, and the 
domestic country specializes in manufactures and the foreign country diversifies after trade. The 
necessary and sufficient condition for this case  is  𝗽𝐿 < (1 − 𝗽)𝐿∗. Then, we obtain the 
following results: 
(i) the foreign country implements strict resource management after trade;   23 
(ii) the shared resource stock recovers to MSY after trade; 
(iii) the domestic country always gains from trade; 
(iv) the foreign country with resource management always suffers utility loss. 
Proof: See Appendix B.1. 
 
   Intuition of this result is as follows. Although the resource stock recovers to MSY by strict 
resource management, the harvest price still increases after trade in the foreign country. Since 
the foreign country produces both kinds of goods, its nominal income remains the same even 
after trade. Thus, the foreign country suffers utility loss. On the other hand, the harvest price 
falls after trade in the domestic country. The domestic country experiences gains from trade 
because of strict resource management by the foreign country. 
   The welfare effects of this trading steady state are striking. The foreign country, which 
implements the technical measures, never benefits from trade. Although the shared stock is 
MSY, the foreign country has to allocate more labor into the resource sector to accomplish the 
world demand for the resource good because of strict resource management. This leads to the 
utility loss in the foreign country. On the contrary, Brander and Taylor (1997) demonstrated that 
a country with resource management always gains from trade even if it exports the resource 
good. Our result suggests that effectiveness of resource management depends on the nature of 
the renewable resource, i.e., shared or local resources. Takarada (2009) showed that without 
resource management, trade may cause steady state utility to fall in the resource importing 
country.  However, we show that the  resource importing  country benefits from  trade under 
resource management by the resource exporting country. 
 
5.2 Specialization in both countries 
   Without resource management, the pattern of production is specialized for both the domestic 
and foreign country, if and only if  1 ≤ 𝗽𝐿/(1 − 𝗽)𝐿∗ ≤ 𝑞∗/𝑞  (see Appendix A.3). This pattern 
of production arises under the mild demand for the harvest. In this case, the shared stock is 
reduced by trade.  We assume 𝑟 > 𝑞∗𝐿∗  to  make sure the post-trade resource stock to be   24 
positive. The welfare effects of free trade are ambiguous for both countries. The domestic and 
foreign steady state utility level may fall or rise after trade. 
   Under unilateral resource management, the foreign government’s problem is to maximize 
the post-trade steady state utility,  𝑢3
∗, which can be simplified as  max𝑞∗≥0 𝑞∗(𝑟 − 𝑞∗𝐿∗). Then, 
we derive the optimal post-trade harvesting technology as 
     𝑞3
∗ = 𝑟/2𝐿∗.                                                             (39) 
Assumption Eq.(9) implies that 𝑟 > 2𝑞𝐿∗. From the condition 1 ≤ 𝗽𝐿/(1 − 𝗽)𝐿∗ ≤ 𝑞∗/𝑞, we 
obtain 
     𝗽𝐿 ≥ (1 − 𝗽)𝐿∗,  𝑟 ≥ 2𝑞𝗽𝐿/(1 − 𝗽).                                         (40) 
Then, we obtain the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4. Suppose that only the foreign country implements resource management and both 
countries specialize after trade.  The necessary and sufficient condition for this case is 
𝗽𝐿 ≥ (1 − 𝗽)𝐿∗  and  𝑟 ≥ 2𝑞𝗽𝐿/(1 − 𝗽). Then, we obtain the following results: 
(i) the foreign country implements strict resource management after trade; 
(ii) the shared resource stock recovers to MSY after trade; 
(iii) the domestic country always gains from trade; 
(iv) trade may benefit or harm the foreign country with resource management. 
Proof: See Appendix B.2. 
 
   This result implies that a win-win situation may occur when the steady state is specialized 
for both countries, which is similar to the case without resource management. The domestic 
country experience gains from trade because of the same reason as in Proposition 3. The foreign 
country benefits from trade if the increase of the wage rate covers the welfare loss caused by the 
rise of the resource price after trade. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks   25 
   This paper examines the effects of international trade between countries that enforce the 
technical measures for fisheries management when those countries share access to a common 
resource stock. We clarify the possibility of cooperative resource management of the shared 
stock. The technical measures are basic fisheries management and most widely implemented 
management tools. Therefore, it is reasonable to consider the technical measures as a method for 
international management of shared fisheries stocks. In this paper, enforcement of the technical 
measures is modeled as restriction on the harvesting technology because the technical measures 
control the catch that can be achieved from a given fishing effort. We make no claim that the 
present model explains all aspects of the technical measures. The basic insights of our analysis 
will have relevance as long as the technical measures increase costs to catch a certain quantity 
of the harvest. 
   The main contribution of this paper is to consider resource management of shared renewable 
stocks in a general equilibrium model of international trade. Analyses of the existing literature 
are commonly based on partial equilibrium models where prices are given and where there is no 
factor movement between sectors, and neither explicitly investigate the role of international 
trade. With consideration of the price effect and factor movement, we obtain striking results. 
   We show that under bilateral resource management, what we call cooperative management 
will be achieved when the demand for the harvest is sufficiently high. In this high demand case, 
the price of the harvest is high so that the shared stock is most in jeopardy. However, both 
countries enforce strict technical measures and the shared stock recovers to MSY after trade. 
Although enforcement of the technical measures is not the first-best policy, they can internalize 
the negative externalities caused by over-exploitation of the shared resource stock. This result 
implies that international trade succeeds in conservation of the shared resource. 
   Cooperative resource management is realized because the government is not myopic and 
maximizes its steady state utility, and implements robust monitoring, control and surveillance. 
Under a high price of the harvest, the resource exporting country prefers keeping a large 
resource stock to harvest the resource efficiently and to export a large amount of the harvest. On 
the other hand, the resource importing country wishes to avoid over-exploitation in order to   26 
import the harvest with a lower price than absent cooperative resource management. Thus, both 
countries are better off compared with the non-cooperative management case. However, under 
mild demand for the harvest, unfortunately, non-cooperative resource management is realized 
and trade exacerbates the level of the shared resource stock.  We  suggest that countries 
concerned should conserve highly valued shared resources in the world market. 
   We also demonstrate that contrary to conventional wisdom, under low demand for the 
harvest,  trade liberalization may harm the resource exporting country  with  strict  resource 
management which leads to MSY. Since the shared resource is open access in this paper, there 
is no positive profit in the resource sector. This may be the reason why a country with strict 
technical measures is unlikely to experience gains from trade. 
   It is important to consider other types of resource management such as output controls in a 
general equilibrium model when countries or regions share renewable resources. We expect that 
qualitative features of our results remain valid even under other management tools. A general 
equilibrium analysis provides important insights and a better understanding of shared resources 
that cannot be derived in partial equilibrium models. 
 
 
Appendix A: Trade without resource management 
   In this appendix, we explain the results under three patterns of trading steady state without 
resource management, which is shown by Takarada (2009). 
 
A.1 Harvest in both countries 
   When the domestic country produces both goods and the foreign country only produces  𝐻, 
we have 𝑤 = 1  and  𝑤∗ ≥ 1.  The world price of  𝐻  can be written as  𝑝1 = 1/(𝑞𝑆1) =
𝑤∗/(𝑞∗𝑆1), where 𝑆1  is the post-trade resource stock. Then, we  have  𝑤∗ = 𝑞∗/𝑞 > 1, 
𝑀𝐷 = (1 − 𝗽)𝐿, and  𝑀𝐷
∗ = (1 − 𝗽)𝑤∗𝐿∗. 
   Since  𝑀  is only produced in the domestic country, the world supply of  𝑀  is  𝑀𝑆 = 𝐿 − 𝐿𝐻.   27 
Therefore, the market-clearing condition for  𝑀   can be expressed as 𝐿𝐻 = 𝗽𝐿 − (1 −
𝗽)(𝑞∗/𝑞)𝐿∗. Since  𝐻  is also produced in the domestic country, we must have  0 < 𝐿𝐻 < 𝐿, 
which leads to  𝗽𝐿/(1 − 𝗽)𝐿∗ > 𝑞∗/𝑞.  This steady state requires  𝐺(𝑆1) = 𝑞𝑆1𝐿𝐻 + 𝑞∗𝑆1𝐿∗. 
Then, we obtain  𝑆1 = 𝐾(1 − 𝑞𝗽𝐿/𝑟 − 𝑞∗𝗽𝐿∗/𝑟) = 𝑆𝐴. 
   The domestic utility remains the same as autarky, 
     𝑢1 = 𝐿[𝑞𝗽𝐾(1 − 𝑞𝗽𝐿 𝑟 ⁄ − 𝑞∗𝗽𝐿∗/𝑟)]𝗽(1 − 𝗽)1−𝗽 = 𝑢𝐴.                       (A1) 
The foreign utility rises after trade and is denoted by 
     𝑢1
∗ = 𝐿∗(𝑞∗/𝑞){𝗽𝑞𝐾(1 − 𝑞𝗽𝐿/𝑟 − 𝑞∗𝗽𝐿∗/𝑟)}𝗽(1 − 𝗽)1−𝗽 = 𝑢𝐴
∗(𝑞∗/𝑞).          (A2) 
 
A.2 Production of manufactures in both countries 
   When the domestic country only produces  𝑀  and the foreign country produces both goods, 
we must have  𝑤 = 𝑤∗ = 1. Then, we have  𝑀𝐷 = (1 − 𝗽)𝐿  and  𝑀𝐷
∗ = (1 − 𝗽)𝐿∗. The supply 
of  𝑀  in each country is given by  𝑀𝑆 = 𝐿  and  𝑀𝑆
∗ = 𝐿∗ − 𝐿𝐻
∗ . The material balance condition 
for  𝑀  implies that  𝐿𝐻
∗ = 𝗽(𝐿 + 𝐿∗). Since  𝑀  is also produced in the foreign country, we must 
have  0 < 𝐿𝐻
∗ < 𝐿∗, which leads to 
     𝗽𝐿/(1 − 𝗽)𝐿∗ < 1.                                                      (A3) 
To show sufficiency, we rewrite Eq.(A3) as  (1 − 𝗽)(𝐿 + 𝐿∗) > 𝐿. Wage rates 𝑤  and  𝑤∗ 
cannot be less than 1. Therefore, we have  (1 − 𝗽)(𝑤𝐿 + 𝑤∗𝐿∗) > 𝐿.  The left hand side, 
(1 − 𝗽)(𝑤𝐿 + 𝑤∗𝐿∗),  is the world demand of 𝑀,  whereas  the right hand side,  𝐿,  is the 
maximum amount of  𝑀  that can be produced in the domestic country. This implies that the 
foreign country also produces a certain amount of 𝑀. Hence, Eq.(A3) ensures a diversified 
steady state for the foreign country. 
   A steady state requires  𝐺(𝑆2) = 𝑞∗𝑆2𝐿𝐻
∗ , where  𝑆2  is the post-trade stock. We obtain 
     𝑆2 = 𝐾(1 − 𝑞∗𝗽𝐿/𝑟 − 𝑞∗𝗽𝐿∗/𝑟).                                          (A4) 
𝑆2 > 0  holds if and only if  𝑟 > 𝑞∗𝗽(𝐿 + 𝐿∗). We can easily obtain  𝑆2 < 𝑆𝐴  because  𝑞 < 𝑞∗. 
   The domestic utility after trade can be expressed as 
     𝑢2 = 𝐿[𝑞∗𝗽𝐾(1 − 𝑞∗𝗽𝐿/𝑟 − 𝑞∗𝗽𝐿∗/𝑟)]𝗽(1 − 𝗽)1−𝗽.                       (A5) 
We can show that  𝑢2 > 𝑢𝐴  if  𝑟 > (𝑞 + 𝑞∗)𝗽𝐿 + 𝑞∗𝗽𝐿∗. The foreign utility falls after trade and   28 
is denoted by 
     𝑢2
∗ = 𝐿∗[𝑞∗𝗽𝐾(1 − 𝑞∗𝗽𝐿/𝑟 − 𝑞∗𝗽𝐿∗/𝑟)]𝗽(1 − 𝗽)1−𝗽.                         (A6) 
 
A.3 Specialization in both countries 
   When the domestic country specializes in 𝑀  and the foreign country specializes in  𝐻, this 
steady state requires 𝐺(𝑆3) = 𝑞∗𝑆3𝐿∗, where 𝑆3  is  the post-trade resource stock. Then,  we 
obtain 
     𝑆3 = 𝐾(1 − 𝑞∗𝐿∗/𝑟).                                                     (A7) 
𝑆3 > 0  holds under  𝑟 > 𝑞∗𝐿∗. 
   The wage rate in the foreign country must satisfy  𝑤∗ ≥ 1. The world price of 𝐻  can be 
written as  𝑝3 = 𝑤∗/𝑞∗𝑆3, which cannot exceed the domestic production cost of the resource 
good  1/𝑞𝑆3. Thus,  the condition for this steady state is 1 ≤ 𝑤∗ ≤ 𝑞∗/𝑞.  We  obtain  𝑀𝐷 =
(1 − 𝗽)𝐿  and  𝑀𝐷
∗ = (1 − 𝗽)𝑤∗𝐿∗. The world supply of 𝑀  is  𝑀𝑆 = 𝐿. The market-clearing 
condition implies  𝑤∗ = 𝗽𝐿/(1 − 𝗽)𝐿∗. Then, the necessary and sufficient condition becomes 
1 ≤ 𝗽𝐿/(1 − 𝗽)𝐿∗ ≤ 𝑞∗/𝑞. The domestic and foreign steady state utility may both fall or rise 
after trade and they are given by 
     𝑢3 = (1 − 𝗽)𝐿1−𝗽[𝑞∗𝐾𝐿∗(1 − 𝑞∗𝐿∗/𝑟)]𝗽,                                   (A8) 
     𝑢3
∗ = 𝗽𝐿1−𝗽[𝑞∗𝐾𝐿∗(1 − 𝑞∗𝐿∗/𝑟)]𝗽.                                           (A9) 
 
 
Appendix B: Proofs of propositions 
B.1 Proof of Proposition 3 
    The assumption that foreign country exports  𝐻  requires  𝑞 < 𝑞2
∗, which implies 
     𝑟 > 2𝑞𝗽(𝐿 + 𝐿∗).                                                       (B1) 
In this production pattern, Eq.(A.3) must hold, which is shown in Appendix A.2. 
   Substituting  𝑞2
∗  for  𝑞∗  in Eq.(A4), the post-trade resource stock becomes  𝑆𝑇2 = 𝐾/2 >
𝑆𝐴′. The world price of 𝐻  is  𝑝𝑇2 = 1/𝑞2
∗𝑆𝑇2 = 4𝗽(𝐿 + 𝐿∗)/𝑟𝐾. From Eqs.(14) and (B1), we   29 
can easily show that 𝑝𝐴
′ > 𝑝𝑇2. From Eq.(B1), we have  𝑟/𝑞𝗽 > 2(𝐿 + 𝐿∗), which implies that 
1 − 𝑞𝗽𝐿 𝑟 ⁄ > 1 − 𝐿 2(𝐿 + 𝐿∗) ⁄ = (𝐿 + 2𝐿∗) 2(𝐿 + 𝐿∗) ⁄ . Then, from Eq.(14), we obtain 
     𝑝𝑇2 𝑝𝐴
∗′ ⁄ = [(𝐿 + 𝐿∗) 𝐿∗ ⁄ ](1 − 𝑞𝗽𝐿 𝑟 ⁄ )2 
            > [(𝐿 + 𝐿∗) 𝐿∗ ⁄ ][(𝐿 + 2𝐿∗) 2(𝐿 + 𝐿∗) ⁄ ]2 > 1.                         (B2) 
Since the nominal income remains the same as autarky in both countries, trade benefits the 
domestic country but harms the foreign country. 
 
B.2 Proof of Proposition 4 
   Substituting  𝑞3
∗  for  𝑞∗  in Eq.(A7), the post-trade resource stock becomes  𝑆𝑇3 = 𝐾/2 >
𝑆𝐴′. From Appendix A.3, the market clearing condition implies that  𝑤∗ = 𝗽𝐿/(1 − 𝗽)𝐿∗. Since 
the foreign country specializes in  𝐻,  𝑤∗ ≥ 1  must hold. Then, we have 
     𝗽𝐿/(1 − 𝗽)𝐿∗ ≥ 1.                                                        (B3) 
The world price of 𝐻  is  𝑝𝑇3 = 𝑤∗/𝑞3
∗𝑆𝑇3 = 4𝗽𝐿/𝑟𝐾(1 − 𝗽). This price cannot exceed the 
domestic production cost of  𝐻,  1/(𝑞𝑆𝑇3), because the domestic country does not produce  𝐻 
in this trading steady state. Then, we obtain 
     𝑟 ≥ 2𝑞𝗽𝐿/(1 − 𝗽).                                                   (B4) 
Now we show sufficiency. Eq.(B3) contradicts the condition of diversified steady state for the 
foreign country, Eq.(A3). Moreover, Eq.(B4) contradicts the condition of diversified steady state 
for  the  domestic country,  𝗽𝐿/(1 − 𝗽)𝐿∗ > 𝑞∗/𝑞, which is shown in Appendix A.1.  Hence, 
Eqs.(B3) and (B4) ensure specialized steady state for both countries. 
   Taking the difference between 𝑞𝐴
∗   and  𝑞3
∗  yields  𝑞𝐴
∗ − 𝑞3
∗ = [𝑟(1 − 𝗽) − 𝑞𝗽𝐿] 2𝗽𝐿∗ ⁄ . 
From Eq.(B4), we know that  𝑟(1 − 𝗽) − 𝑞𝗽𝐿 > 0.  Thus,  𝑞𝐴
∗ > 𝑞3
∗.  We can easily derive 
𝑝𝐴
′ > 𝑝𝑇3  because of Eq.(B4). Since the domestic nominal income remains the same as autarky, 
the domestic country always gains from trade. The steady state utility of the foreign country is 
denoted by  𝑢𝑇3
∗ = 𝗽𝐿1−𝗽(𝑟𝐾/4)𝗽. The effect of trade on 𝑢𝑇3
∗   is ambiguous. We can obtain 
that  𝑢𝑇3
∗ > 𝑢𝐴′  if  𝗽[𝐿 (1 − 𝗽)𝐿∗ ⁄ ]1−𝗽 > (1 − 𝑞𝗽𝐿/𝑟)2𝗽.   30 
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